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LIGHTNING - APOLLO TO SHUTTLE
W. R. Durrett
John F. Kennedy Space Center

ABSTRACT
The lightning discharge that struck the Apollo 12
spacecraft thirty-six seconds after launch pointed
up a whole series of problems that called out for
answers if the Manned Space Program were to
proceed with minimum impact to future missions
and the crews that would fly them. This paper
traces the history of lightning study by the
Kennedy Space Center from then to now with par
ticular emphasis on the potential problems that
may arise in the process of getting ready for and
carrying out the Space Shuttle Program.

carefully for the protection offered, cost,
operational practicality, ruggedness, and safety.
Nothing was considered "crackpot" at this stage.
Every solution was given the same screening. The
final choice was, as nearly always, compromise.
There were concepts that offered better pad
protection than the one selected, and concepts
that offered better rollout protection, but none
that cost less or that did both jobs any better.
The design consisted of a folding mast (to allow
access in and out of the VAB doors) mounted on
top of the hammerhead crane on top of the LUT,
with a lightning rod on top. The assembly
extended above the vehicle sufficiently so that
a lightning stroke would terminate on the
lightning rod and not strike the vehicle itself.
This concept is known as the 1:1 cone of pro
tection:- as long as the mast is higher above the
tip of the vehicle than it is displaced from it
horizontally, the 1:1 concept is satisfied.
Historically, the 1:1 cone of protection provides
an almost perfect protection umbrella from
lightning striking anything under it, and it
proved so in Apollo - no flight vehicle was ever
struck on the pad, although the LUT itself was
struck many times. When this occurred, the
strike current passed from the lightning rod down
the mast structure, past the hammerhead crane
through wiping shoes (that allowed crane movement)
and through the welded LUT structure and Mobile
Launcher to ground. The whole pad area had an
elaborate buried ground counterpoise of many
copper cables, and at the pad the Mobile Launcher
was connected to it by ground jumpers on each of
the six outer pedestals that supported the Mobile
Launcher. There were, in addition, many other
ground paths from the structure by way of hypergolic lines, fuel lines, and the multitude of
other installed paths that exist when a moon
rocket is connected to its ground support equip
ment for checkout prior to launch.

LIGHTNING - APOLLO TO SHUTTLE
The experiences of the Apollo Program with
lightning strikes at the Kennedy Space Center
began with very little formality and with almost
no lost time. On May 25, 1966, the first Apollo
vehicle rolled out of the Vehicle Assembly
Building. This was the 500F proof-test vehicle a full-scale mockup of a Saturn V moon mission
vehicle mounted on the Mobile Launcher and
identical in size and weight to the real thing.
Its purpose was to provide a full dress exercise
of the Crawler and to validate the facilities at
Pad A of Launch Complex 39. The rollout was a
success, and the vehicle was on the pad as of
that afternoon. Two days later, May 27, 1966,
the Launcher Umbilical Tower (LUT) on the Mobile
Launcher (ML) took a strike. The hook on the
hammerhead crane on top of the LUT began dropping
in free fall as its brakes let go, and struck the
side of the second stage. The damage was not
severe, but the Apollo/lightning interface had
begun. Examination showed the brake drum solenoid
contacts welded open.
The lightning protection design for Apollo had
been adopted after consideration of many concepts
for protection of the vehicle during rollout and
while at the pad. The concepts examined covered
almost every possible approach:- masts along the
crawlerway, balloons carrying grounded wires,
balloons carrying lightning rods, kites, folding
screens enclosing the flight vehicle until launch
time, towed structures carrying shielding
enclosures that moved back for launch, telescoping
shrouds mounted on the LUT, removable grounded
shrouds mounted above the vehicle - the solutions
were literally legion. Each one was looked at

There was no lightning instrumentation on the LUT
for that first rollout, but by October of 1968,
for the first manned Saturn V (Apollo 8) rollout,
magnetic slugs (to record peak stroke current)
and a lightning stroke counter had been added to
the lightning mast above the LUT's crane. The
pad was under TV surveillance, but the video was
not recorded.
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stroke current magnetic fields they have been
exposed to, and the stroke counter could not be
relied on to resolve every separate strike - its
reaction time did not exceed 0.1 seconds even
when working. In those six strike days it is
not inconceivable that the complex may have taken
forty to fifty separate lightning strokes.)

Apollo's busiest launch year was 1969. Five
vehicles went to the pads in that twelve-month
period* There had been no strikes since the.
first one in 1966, but in 1967 and 1968 the pads
were empty during the summer storm months, and
no LUT's had been there to be targets. This was
not the case in 1969, but even so, no strikes to
the complex were recorded, Apollo 11 took off
on July 16 for its moon landing after being on
the pad for substantially the full 1969 storm
sea,son 9 but it took no strokes.

The year 1972 again had vacant pads during the
summer; Apollo 16 launched April 17, .ami Apollo 17
was on the pad from September 13 through
December 6. There were two strike days in March,
the 5th and 31st. No damage resulted.

This period of bliss disappeared abruptly on
November 9, 1969, when Apollo 12, thirty-six
seconds into its flight, triggered a cloud-toground stroke that momentarily put the space
craft's guidance system out of commission. The
booster's guidance system, in command at this
point of the mission* was not disrupted, and the
mission continued. It wasn't a strike on the pad,
but the distinction didn't really amount to much;
from that day forward the.Kennedy Space-Center
became lightning conscious.

The lightning mast from Pad 34 was mounted on the
MSS in 1972. Wide and deep as well as tall, much
of the MSS was not inside the 1:1 cone of pro
tection of the LUT's lightning mast and was
subject to being struck at almost any point on
its upper surfaces. The mast gave it a single
preferred attach point for a stroke. This
permitted accessible instrumentation to be
mounted and also provided the flight vehicle on
the pad with protection from an additional 1:1
cone.

The year 1970 was a repeat of 1967 and 1968 in
that there were no launches during the summer
months:- Apollo 13 was launched on April 11 and
Apollo 14 did not rollout until November 9.
There were no known strikes that year.

(The tip of the MSS mast was 25 ft. lower than
the LUT mast and 130 ft. south of it when the
MSS and LUT were both on the pad during checkout.
This, of course, left the MSS mast as a secondary
strike point, and as experience showed, it did
take a few low-energy strikes which came in from
a generally southerly direction. The stronger
strokes invariably went to the LUT mast.)

(The Mobile Service Structure, almost as tall as
the LUT, had been at its parksite south of the
pads since 1965 when it was not on the pad for
checkout. It had magnetic slugs mounted on the
various lightning rods that protected its vent
stacks and extremities but their locations were
almost inaccessible and they had not been serviced
regularly because of the hazard to servicing
personnel. Although it is possible that it had
been struck at the parksite, there was no valid .
data to support known strike activity.)

The storms of 1971 had taught two lessons:improve instrumentation, and pay attention to
indirect lightning effects. Strike current that
went down the LUT mast to ground didn't go just
through the LUT. Some of it went across the
swing arms and to ground through the skin of the
vehicle and the MSS structure. This did no
direct damage to the bird, but the current in
the arm structures induced voltages in the
umbilical cables leading from the LUT to the
vehicle. Some of these cables ran for part of
their lengths along the tops of the arm structures
and were thus exposed to the maximum induction
fields set up by the stroke current flowing in
the swing arms. An analysis revealed that 31.6%
of the total current from a stroke to the LUT of
a Skylab/ASTP configuration would flow across
Swing Arms #8 and #7, which carried the umbilical
cables which led to the spacecraft's guidance
system, and the cables going to the Instrument
Unit mounted on top of the S-IVB third stage and
containing the booster launch guidance system.
To monitor these effects, peak reading voltmeters
were installed to record the voltages on selected
cables that ran across Swing Arms #6, #7, and #8.
This was done for Apollo 17, but no data was
gathered because Apollo 17 took no strikes during
its time on the pad. The system was then carried
over into 1973 and the Skylab Program.

In 1971 the picture changed drastically. Storms
delayed Apollo 14's launch on January 31, but it
was rainshowers, not lightning. Apollo 15 went
to the pad on May 11 and was launched on July 26.
Its stay on the pad nicely spanned the lightning
season, and in this two-month stretch, lightning
hit the complex on six different days:- June 14,
15, and 25, and July 2, 19, and 21. The first
strike, recorded at 98,000 amperes, vaporized
the top three feet of the LUT lightning rod and
blew the face off the stroke counter. The 1971
storms were severe, and the three June storms
caused damage to ground equipment. Examination
revealed some cable shields that had not been
properly grounded, allowing induced voltages to
be fed into the electronics and overload them.
This was corrected, and the last three strike
days (in July) saw no damage. The launch went on
schedule.
(There is no way of knowing for sure how many
times the complex was struck during those six
days. A single lightning flash can include any
where from one to fifteen discrete strokes, of
varying polarities, magnitudes and durations,
Magnetic slugs show only the aggregate of the

Instrumentation on the pad was not the only
lightning measuring done. Operations on the
launch pad involved many people working on,
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around and with tall metal structures, liquid and
gaseous oxygen, large volumes of volatiles and
combustibles, cryogenics, hypergolic fuels, and
pyrotechnics. This carried a large danger
quotient if the hazards of a thunderstorm were
ignored. To this end KSC had, in 1965, commenced
the installation of a wide area network of
thunderstorm monitors to report to a central
weather office the existing potential gradient
of the atmosphere above each monitor instrument.
When high readings began to appear, indicating a
rising electrification of the air, the weather
office was able to issue an adverse weather
warning to the operating areas so that the proper
safety measures could be taken before bad weather
arrived. This network, constructed in phases,
consisted of twenty-five monitoring stations
spread over almost a hundred square miles by the
time Apollo 11 rolled out in May of 1969. The
original Sweeney instruments were phased out in
favor of rotating field mills, and by the end of
1972, steps were in process to present the output
of the field mills in the weather office as an
integrated display.

stroke magnitudes were above the 100,000 ampere
(saturation) level of the magnetic slugs on the
LUT, with a 64,000 ampere peak on the MSS. The
mast-mounted coils did not provide reliable data;
the coil output leads running down the lightning
masts of both LUT and MSS were picking up induced
voltages that invalidated the readings. Inductionproof output leads were needed, a difficult task
when the leads ran within inches of 100,000
ampere plus pulsed currents. The June 17 strikes
were severe enough to damage some of the more
sensitive on-board instrumentation signal con
ditioners which were mounted close to the skin
of the vehicle, but repairs did not delay the
launch on July 28.
The MSS had two strike days right after the
launch. A 57,000 ampere multiple stroke was
recorded on July 29, and three separate flashes
containing a total of nine strikes occurred on
August 1. This last gave a good illustration of
the weakness of magnetic slugs as recorders. The
peak magnitude recorded by the slugs for August 1
was 4,200 amperes, while the peak sensing coil
recorded 200,000+ amperes. The coil reading was
admittedly not valid by previous experience, but
the difference shows that the slugs did not
record the actual peak magnitude. Obviously
there had been polarity differences in the nine
strokes.

The year 1973 opened with a known heavy launch
schedule for the Skylab Program. Pad B had been
refitted to handle the Saturn IB vehicle to be
used as astronaut carriers up to and back from
the lab, and there were exactly eighty-five days
in the year when vehicle checkout was not in
progress on the pad. Lightning coverage of this
program was comprehensive. The field mill network
was in full operation. The KSC Weather Office
had a new experimental X-band weather radar that
could probe developing cloud masses for glaciation
and precipitation levels to help in the task of
predicting thunderstorms. The pads were under
surveillance by three lightning-triggered fisheye lens cameras that photographed the entire sky
and by the operational television system that put
selected cameras in a video recording mode when
an adverse weather warning was in force. Instru
mentation coils sensed any stroke current that
appeared in the Mobile Launcher and MSS pedestals
and current sensing coils had been mounted on
the ML and MSS lightning masts just below the
magnetic slugs. Lightning induced voltages were
monitored in thirteen selected circuits whose
cables ran across the upper sensing arms of the
LUT, with control readings to winnow out power!ine
surges.

Skylab 4 showed again the importance of high
integrity in the overall shields of cables that
are exposed to the induced effects of lightning
currents. A multiple-stroke 100,000+ ampere
bolt hit the LUT on August 15, a few hours after
its arrival on the pad after rollout on August 14.
All the cabling changes to pad configuration had
not been completed, and a temporary cable on
Swing Arm #8 was still connected into the
Command Module with its shield grounded only at'
one end. Damage occurred in the Inertia!
Measurement Unit blower motor control system,
and again some of the more sensitive instrumen
tation signal conditioners mounted near the skin
were affected. Repairs did not delay the launch
on November !6.
The lightning and weather encountered in the
Apollo and Skylab Programs prompted a thorough
study of the adverse effects they might impose
on the Apollo Soyuz Test Project. This mission
had to work with unusually narrow launch windows
that were dictated by the orbital requirements
for rendezvous and docking with Soyuz, and it was
scheduled for launch on July 15, the middle of
KSC's thunderstorm season. Weather that did not
fall inside the limits given by the Launch-Mission
Rules, or retesting required because of a
lightning stroke that occurred late in the count,
could scrub a launch and jeopardize the mission.
A series of tests was performed at KSC on the
Command and Service Modules and on the Saturn IB
booster stages to determine what induced currents
could be withstood safely. These would guide an
analysis of where the Launch Mission Rules might
be revised to help assure an on-schedule launch.
Full scale tests were conducted in which

The 1973 storm season did its part. Multiple
stroke flashes hit both Pad A and Pad B on May 9.
The Pad A strike, where the Skylab itself sat on
a moon configuration booster, was 36,000 amperes
to the LUT mast. The Pad B stroke, 76,000 amperes,
hit the astronaut's safety slidewire about halfway
out its 2200 ft. length. On May 24, a 4,100
ampere single stroke hit the MSS mast. No damage
anywhere and the Skylab 1 and 2 launches went off
on May 14 and 24.
Skylab 3 went to the pad on June 11, and got
slapped hard on June 17 when a severe storm sat
above the pad for over an hour. Multiple strokes
were recorded to both LUT and MSS. The maximum
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simulated lightning strikes were fed into the
stages and the Induced voltages monitored*
At the same time, a design effort was begun to
come up with a lightning protection system for
the pad that would eliminate or minimize the
Induced effects that had been noted during
Skylab, This meant either eliminating lightning
strikes completely to the LUT and MSS or
minimiltog the flow of stroke current in the LUT
swing arms. Studies were made to evaluate various
methods of preventing lightning strokes from
hitting the complex. It was obvious very quickly
that any proven solutions would be very expensive,
and attention turned to reduction of the swing arm
currents* The design modification settled on
involved replacing the folding metal lightning
mast in the LUT with an insulated mast which would
support an overhead wire running over the mast and
to ground out 1000 ft. on each side of the pad.
Stroke current in this design would go to ground
through the overhead wire, not through the LUT
structure, and there would be no stroke current
flow across the swing arms. The overhead wire
was oriented to be at 90° to the swing arms,
minimi zing any induced currents in the arms from
the stroke current in the overhead wire. The
mast was made tall enough (80 ft.) to hold the
wire at least 50 ft. from the nearest grounded
metal portion of the LUT to prevent arc-over from
the wire. Laboratory tests showed this design
would reduce the induced voltage in the most
sensitive swing arm to 4% of the Apollo/Skylab
configuration, and would afford as good or better
direct stroke protection to the vehicle. The
instrumentation that had been on the old folding
mast was removed and installed at each end of the
overhead wire, thus making two identical sets.
At each station, the peak sensing coil output was
converted to light energy and taken back to the
readout instrumentation by fiber-optic light pipes,
which are not sensitive to heavy induction fields
from stroke current. The magnetic slugs were
retained and a second sensing coil installed.
This coil was a special di/dt coil* sensitive to
rate of change of current rather than current
value. Both peak and di/dt coils fed separate
transient analyzers, which reconstructed and read
out the stroke's waveform as well as its magnitude.
This permitted the analysis of the strike for
duration and rise time as well as magnitude, and
better intelligence of what damage (if it occurred)
was actually due to.
The instrumentation was mocked up in the VAB and
tested in the same kind of tests that were used
to determine the sensitivity of the CSM and the
S-IB booster to simulated lightning* The simu
lated lightning tests conducted in 1974 at KSC
showed that both the CSM and the S-IB were subject
to large induced voltages in their cabling from a
strike. This emphasized the importance of pro
tection from Induced effects on the pad, and good
knowledge of the electrification of the air over
the pad at launch time, particularly at higher
altitudes.
There were no manned launches in 1974, and con
sequently the only tall structure on the pad at
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LC-39 was the MSS. It was used as a test bed to
investigate the possibility that dissipation
arrays might have some effect on the frequency
or nature of lightning strokes, and several
configurations were erected on the MSS and
monitored. Another array was mounted on a
500 ft, weather tower about 3-1/2 miles north
west of the pad. After two years of observation
(1974 and 1975), there is some data that suggests
that the arrays may have an effect on the ratio
of positive to negative strokes that hit, but it
is far from conclusive. There is no indication
of any effect at all on the frequency of strikes;
both structures took hits in both years, five on
the MSS and four on the weather tower. Peak
magnitudes ranged from 18,000 amperes to 80,000
amperes.
During 1975, there were three noteworthy launches the Apollo-Soyuz mission and two Viking unmanned
launches to Mars. Both projects had launch
constraints. The Apollo launch, made with the
Soyuz spacecraft already in orbit, had launch
windows measured in minutes and only the first
two could be missed without seriously limiting
the mission's objectives. The first Viking
lander was to touch down on Mars on July 4, 1976,
as a Bicentennial event, which put a cutoff on
launch date slips. All would launch in the
summer, during the normal thunderstorm season.
Plans were made for instrumented aircraft to
monitor the air electrification at various
altitudes on launch day for all three launches.
This, in conjunction with the ground field mill
readings, would permit the weather office to make
the best possible launch weather forecasts. In
this connection, the weather office had two new
tools to work with in 1975. In the past, the
field mill readouts in the weather office were
printed out individually on strip charts and the
data had to be hand correllated by weather station
personnel. An improved presentation concept had
the outputs of all 25 ground field mills computer
ized and presented to the weather personnel as an
integrated display on a TV screen which showed
the whole KSC area with the field mill data
plotted on it in lines of equal potential
gradient. This display was updated each minute
and gave a dynamic, overall picture of the size,
growth and movement of the charge centers over
the entire launch area.
A second development was the Lightning Detection
and Ranging (LDAR) system, a KSC development
following early work by Dr. E. T, Pierce of
Stanford Research Institute. It senses and plots
RF emissions in the 30-50 MHz range. These
emissions are apparently associated with atmo
spheric discharges and the L'DAR plots them on a
TV display in altitude, azimuth and range. The
system is still in development, but it has shown
some good correlation to the charge centers
plotted by the field mill network. It stands to
be a good lightning locator and plotter,
particularly for storm activity outside the range
of the field mills.

gave the best results. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had done some
preliminary study in this area that showed
promise. The experiment showed that a different
seeding technique would be required for Florida
storms than was used in the western mountain
storms that NOAA had studied earlier. Florida
storms have their freezing level well up inside
the cloud mass, while mountain storms have theirs
lower down, toward cloud base, and for the
seeding to be effective, it must be done so that
the chaff is drawn into the freezing area. In
Florida this means penetrating the storm with
the aircraft - seeding just under the clouds is
insufficient. That can be hazardous, and needs
to be studied in more detail. NOAA plans to
continue investigation of chaff seeding at KSC
during the summer of 1976 as part of Thunderstorm
Project II, the nationwide study being conducted
over the next three years by the scientific and
academic community to investigate the electrical
properties of thunderstorms. This effort should
result in a much fuller understanding of how
thunderstorms tick. We hope to learn what
properties must exist before lightning comes into
being, and how charges in the air and in various
cloud formations relate to the instrument readings
probing that same area from ground level.
Hopefully in the future, the possibility of
lightning in a storm can be predicted before the
storm develops, and the storm's development and
growth charted well ahead of the actual thing.
The Shuttle is to be an operational vehicle, and
routine launch operations at present planned
launch rates will need the best weather knowledge
and predictability that is available.

The ASTP Apollo rolled out on March 24 and lifted
off on schedule on July 16. The late-in-count
strikes which could have been a problem did not
materialize, nor were there any thunderstorms in
the near vicinity of the pad to threaten a launch
hold. KSC's weather had been kind to the Apollo
Soyuz Test Project - in some respects too kind.
It had been hoped that the weather would give the
mast and wire design and its instrumentation a
good enough workout to prove that it truly would
reduce the induced effects of a strike the way
its laboratory tests predicted. As it was, the
new mast and overhead wire pad protection design
was struck four times in 1975. The first two
occurred three minutes apart on May 14, with too
low a peak magnitude (<10,000 amperes) to
register on the wire-end instrumentation. Tele
vision pictures of both flashes showed that both
were low energy, single strokes. A 35,000 ampere
stroke hit the overhead wire on June 9, and a
100,000 ampere stroke to the LUT mast occurred on
July 20. This last stroke came with the LUT still
on the pad but five days after the launch. It
was recorded and measured by both coil systems and
the magnetic slugs with good agreement, and this
did demonstrate the validity of the wire-end
instrumentation under actual conditions.
During the full stay of the vehicle on the pad,
the peak reading voltmeters monitoring the
critical circuits on Swing Arm #7 had been moni
tored carefully; their readings were the criteria
for determining whether retest would be required
after a strike. None of the first three strokes
caused any detectable current induction. The
last stroke yielded no valid induction data since,
after the launch, the current path across the
arm down the vehicle skin and the MSS to ground
was not there.

The insulated mast and overhead wire is the base
line design for lightning protection of the
Shuttle while on the pad, so the instrumentation
and lightning protection developed for ASTP will
carry over and be the lightning system for the
Space Shuttle era. The mast will be permanently
mounted on the Shuttle Service and Access Tower.
The stainless steel overhead wire will be oriented
north and south instead of ASTP's east and west,
but will extend out approximately the same
distance.

The Viking I and II launches had lightning
problems of their own. A stroke to ground is
believed to have been responsible for a surge in
one of Viking I's control circuits that caused a
partial switch closure in the payload that pre
maturely drained a flight battery, requiring a
payload changeout before launch. Viking II,
however, gave proof that the airborne charge
measurements planned to be made in the face of
marginal weather had measurable operational value.
A storm moved into the vicinity of Viking's launch
complex as the count approached T-0. According to
conventional conditions it was a "launch hold"
situation until the storm moved out of the area.
The aircraft readings, however, showed that the
storm's charge centers were moving more slowly
than predicted. This was relayed to the launch
director, and Viking II lifted off on schedule.
Five minutes later the pad was in heavy rain and
the storm did not clear the pad before the launch
window would have closed.

The Shuttle, with its sophisticated electronics,
stands to be particularly vulnerable to lightning
and design criteria pointed specifically to
protect against harmful lightning effects were
drawn up by a lightning task team early in the
design phase. Special attention is being given
to cable shielding and to the level of transients
that equipment will be able to withstand without
disruption or damage. The Orbiter will undergo
an extensive test before it comes to KSC in which
it will be subjected to full-strength simulated
lightning entering and leaving the vehicle at
various points. There is a development program
in work at KSC that aims toward deliberate
triggering of a natural stroke to the Service and
Access Tower, thus permitting the determination of
induced effects on ground support equipment, and
measurement under controlled conditions of any
induced effects that could affect critical

Investigating other possible means of preventing
lightning, an experiment was run following the
ASTP launch that involved the seeding of selected
thunderstorms with conductive chaff from aircraft
to ascertain if this would diminish lightning
occurrence, and if so, what seeding procedures
4-31

equipment placement or be transmitted from the
complex to the vehicle through checkout cabling.
All the electrical leads from the ground leading
into the Shuttle will interface with the flight
vehicle as close to the Mobile Launcher Platform
as possible, to eliminate the high current
Induction of the Apollo configuration.
When the Shuttle lifts off Pad A in 1979, it will
be a lightning-proofed vehicle launched from a
lightning-proofed complex* Jove's thunderbolt
will undoubtedly be with us for many years to
come* but not as the mystery it has been in the
past, and the Manned Space Programs will have
done their share toward drawing the veil.

